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INTRODUCTION
This Essay recounts how feminist theorists and activists managed to write their ideals into the fabric of French law and culture, and how nonfeminists began to appropriate those ideals to advance exclusions of Muslims.
The 1789 D&laration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) defines all citizens as equal under the law. Soon after the bicentennial of the Ddclaration des droits de l'homme in 1989, feminists began an organized push to improve women's political representation through a quota.' In 2000, France adopted Paritd, a law that requires that half of all candidates for public office be women. 2 For Pariti to succeed, it had to account for the values of universalisme, which bars quotas that differentiate among citizens.3 Feminists argued that since this universel was dual-male and female-Parit would justly give women half of the power of the body politic. Parit's passage transformed feminist interest in sex difference and women's equality into a core valeur rdpublicaine.
Then, like a drop of water in a pond, these feminist ideas disappeared in plain sight: they became intrinsic to French state norms and public values. As they became woven into state norms, however, politicians began to use them to promote exclusions. The feminism of Pariti flipped from including women to excluding after he engineered the 2011 burqa ban, conservative leader JeanFrangois Cop6 and his colleague Marie-Jo Zimmermann led the push for a corporate board quota. 6 With passage and implementation of the CBQ, feminism made a complete transformation, from marginal leftist theory to elite conservative discourse. Conservative Cop6 exploited feminist justifications for advancing women's corporate equality while true Parit feminists remained uninvolved.7
Most recently, feminist ideas have been called upon to exclude French Muslims with proposed burkini bans. From 2014 to 2016, feminist rhetoric resurfaced again as municipalities across southern France banned the "burkini," a modest, full-coverage bathing suit8 Particularly after the 2016 Bastille Day terrorist attack, 9 debate over how women dress themselves became a central component of the French state's response to terrorism. The Conseil d'Itat struck down burkini bans;o nevertheless, feminist arguments that promoted those bans helped further nationalist depictions of the Republic.
Through its four parts-respectively on Parit6, the veil/burqa bans, the CBQ, and burkini bans-this Essay will show that the feminist push for women's inclusion came to play a role in deepening religious exclusions.
II. PARITA: FEMIMSM ENTERS THE STATE
In the late nineteenth century, Hubertine Auclert, a French suffragist, wrote that women should have half the seats in the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb that show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools], J.O., Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190.
6.
Quotas for women epitomize how feminism has come to exercise influence over states, and nowhere is this truer than in France. After Pariti mandated equal numbers of female and male political candidates, the CBQ required sex diversity in boardrooms. Here, conservatives became content to deploy feminist arguments to force women's inclusion into the corporate board context.
7.
Cop6 was depicted as an opportunist by a political opponent during the debates on the CBQ. Margaux Collet, Danielle Bousquet: "Des forces conservatrices bloquent les avanc&s des droits des femmes," LIBERATION (Mar. 8, 2010, 6:29 PM), http://www. liberation.fr/societe/2010/03/08/danielle-bousquet-des-forces-conservatrices-bloquent-lesavancees-des-droits-des-femmes_613990. 
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Assembly. 1 Nearly a century later, France experienced a powerful women's movement in the 1960s, much like the one happening in the concurrent second wave of feminism in the United States. In 1980, the first proposed sex quota included 20% of candidates in elections in towns of more than 2500.12 A subsequent 25% version was passed by the National Assembly, but the Constitutional Council rejected it in 1982 as violating the indivisibility of the sovereign nation, an idea linked to universalism.13 Universalism had blocked the first effort.14 Enshrined in the 1789 Dclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, universalism-a radical eighteenth century Enlightenment response to monarchy-meant that the state would consider each citizen as completely equal. 5 In the 1990s, feminists reimagined the quota as Parit6 to survive consideration by the Constitutional Council. 16 This new approach required that half of all political candidates be women, although the legislature reserved no seats for women. 7 Women were half of humanity (1'homme in the sense of humankind) and so needed to be particularly included in the universal. The universal remained unchanged: it was still the ideal, now including rather than excluding women.
Parit in this sense did not constitute minority representation, which would be impermissible under universalism. This dual universal became a public norm that even opponents had to embrace, in word if not by deed.18
11.
HUBERTINEAUCLERT, LA CITOYENNE: ARTICLES DE 1881 A 1891, at 52 (1982).
12.
GIL Feminists made a concerted political effort to enact Pariti as law.19 Their deft strategizing targeted both the French intelligentsia and popular opinion. To skirt the anti-quota taboo in France, Frangoise Gaspard-a former Socialist member of the National Assembly, its first openly lesbian member, and an intellectual and political leader of the Paritd movement-argued that since women were not a minority, Pariti was not a quota: "distingue du quota par sa philosophie mdme."20 The 85% male legislature agreed. Across party lines, it revised the Constitution in 1999 and passed the law in 2000, ensuring "equal access of women and men to electoral office and elected functions."21
Paritd did not realize advocates' dreams of a rapid increase in women's representation-women currently only constitute 38.6% of the National Assembly-but it did institutionalize the feminist goal of women's equality elsewhere in the state and guarantee their place at the 6 Muslims tend to be more devout. They constitute France's second-largest religious and primary ethnic minority. 3 7 This minority faces exclusion: "Narrowly linked to the exclusionary and racial conception of citizenship, la'citd did not respect its claimed trait of universalism." 
34.
LAURENCE, supra note 32, at 2. For her, the duality of the French republic with regard to sex still invited a pluralist recognition of other differences, rather than exclusion of minorities.43 Indeed, she referred to the proban feminism as having a "caractere liberticide."44
35.
Advocates were mindful of the need to present the ban as neutral lest it be considered a relic of France's colonialism. The law encompassed more religious symbols-large crosses and yarmulkes-although none were as prevalent as the veil.45 Such denials of "exception" only proved the contrary--everyone knew that the law's intent was to control the wearing of the veil.
In 2004, the National Assembly passed the ban, with an exception for small symbols.46 The Conseil d'ttat ratified the law. While the wearing of large religious items in public schools did not necessarily violate laicitd, the items might "constitute an act of 49 With this change, laicitd went from a right to freedom from religious inequality to a duty to restrict. In feminist terms, Gaspard's pluralist feminism lost while Halimi's liberticide feminism won. Nonfeminist leaders took notice.
In 2009, National Assembly member Jean-Frangois Cop6 began an effort to ban burqas. Burqas were "[une] bless[ure] pour la dignit6 de la femme," an injury to the dignity of woman as an ideal, not "des femmes"-of women as a group. 50 France needed protection, Cop6 argued, from people who were "instrumentalizing religion" to disregard French fraternit, in which one's face forms a civic presence.
51
Feminist framings of the burqa debate proved useful for nonfeminists. Then-President Nicolas Sarkozy's support persuaded some. He stated that
The issue with the burqa is not a religious one. It is an issue of the liberty and dignity of woman. The burqa is a sign of enslavement; it is a sign of abasement .... We cannot accept in our country that women would be prisoners behind a gate, cut from all social life, deprived of all identity. It is not the idea that we have of the dignity of woman. 
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of living together, men and women."5 3 This vivre ensemble between men and women constituted "an inheritance of history, a trait of our identity."4 Cop6, therefore, framed burqas as "walls of fabric" that upend the vivre ensemble of men and women. 55 Cop6 insisted that women's faces must be exposed as part of their role in the vivre ensemble with men. 56 The heteronormativity of this vivre ensemble, if unintended by Cop6, remains evident-it points to people relating across sexes, in what some might describe as a sexual market. The strong modesty of burqas violates this French ideal of the sexual nature of women's (as well as men's) visible faces and bodies. Actual feminists-like Halimi and many others-proved secondary in the law's realization, even as they legitimized the opportunistic feminism of these prominent hommes politiques.57
Even so, the implicit heteronormativity of Cop6's vivre ensemble argument did not spring fully formed from his imagination. It recalls an entire strain of French feminism that emphasized heterosexuality, femininity, and how the erotics of sexual difference gave women power in society.58 Other feminists, such as historian Mona Ouzouf and philosopher Elisabeth Badinter, focused on the doux commerce (passionate economy) between the sexes as a basis for feminism, a basis to oppose Pariti as overly driven by equality in a way that submerged difference. "Muslims did not understand that open erotic play was integral to Frenchness;" therefore, these feminists questioned the inclusion of Muslim culture within the Republic. 5 9 For example, in an essay on chivalry, feminist Claude Habib insisted on French seduction as a bulwark against Islamism.60
Cop6 did not just allude to feminist theory-he explicitly included a nonbinding resolution in favor of respect for women's
53.
Cop6, supra note 50. Designer Hussein Chalayan exposed a logical fallacy in Cop6's argument that burqas remove sexual agency. Chalayan's 1998 spring collection, which became a highlight of his 2011 solo exposition at the Mus6e des Arts D6coratifs, illustrated the complex meaning of veiling and voyeurism, and the power/vulnerability in both nudity and being entirely covered.
The collection continues to challenge both traditional Muslim mores against exposure and twenty-first-century French tendencies toward it.64 Chalayan's work foreshadowed how subsequent anti- ("[S]ome girls were naked from the waist down, the last completely nude save for a face covering. Most definitely no designer could attempt that now, but at the time Chalayan never meant to cause offense: 'It was about how we define our territory culturally."'); Hussein Chalayan-Burka (1996), MISANTHROPE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://ilikecatsmorethanpeople.blogspot.com/2010/11/ burqa activists would use the language of feminism without actually engaging its ideals.
When opponents appealed the burqa ban to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Court rejected France's gender argument for the ban.
6 5 The ECHR responded skeptically, in part because some women embraced the practice, and a ban would hinder their personal freedom; 6 6 nonetheless, the Court upheld the ban, declaring that it was "not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in question but solely on the fact that it conceals the face."67 The focus of the ECHR was the effect on participating in or hiding from civic life.
6 8 It warned any state party to the ECHR to avoid stereotypes that foster intolerance.69
The veil and burqa bans exposed a previously unnoted paternalism beneath the universalist, republican mantle of the law: women needed inclusion as women in the polity. Cop6 redeployed Paritd's logic with the new idea that women who-for ethnic or religious reasons-did not disappear into French fraternit, were being degraded, and needed rescue by the Republic.70 Unenumerated Muslim minorities remained subject to both socio-economic exclusion and restrictions on their self-expression. These successful appropriations of originally progressive feminist arguments made those arguments available for later use by other French national and nationalist projects. 73. Mixit is a French term meaning sex diversity, but the "mixing" implies a mixing of the two sexes. 
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of French corporate leadership, Zimmermann agreed with the Norwegian business argument that including women would add talent and improve management. She expressed pride in how much the CBQ would enrich business and ameliorate a system that was a little too easy going. 75 The leaders of the CBQ effort, Zimmermann and Cop6, stand in marked contrast to the feminists who advanced Paritd. Both are conservative politicians, and neither will admit wholeheartedly to a feminist orientation. In 2011, Zimmermann conveyed her hesitant feminism:
Today, my views on women's issues have greatly evolved. I look differently at the society, insofar as it does not leave a prominent place to women. I also appear to systematically claim a better recognition of women. If it is to be a feminist to claim equality for women, then yes, I am one of them. 76 Zimmermann's reluctant feminism matches Cop6's awkward melange of paternalism and chivalry packaged as women's rights.
A conversation with a Norwegian minister who warned that the Germans might legislate first led Zimmermann to fast-track the CBQ to preserve France's reputation as a European leader.77 Zimmermann secured the support of Cop6, around whom conservatives had rallied after his successful use of feminism in the burqa debate. Cop6 saw protecting and advancing women as an opportunity for his then-rising political career. He agreed to support the CBQ possibly to burnish his nascent chivalrous credentials or as a riposte to feminists and those on the left who opposed the burqa ban. 78 To justify the use of an actual quota that overrode French business leaders required Zimmermann and Cop6 to argue that the CBQ would prove profitable. Beyond the goal of advancing women,
75.
Margaret Maruani & Marion Paoletti, Interview, Marie-Jo Zimmermann, le devoir de d6ranger, 25 TRAVAIL, GENRE ET socitEts 5, 16-17 (2011); see also Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 74, at 889-900 (discussing the quota's immediate effect and general compliance).
76.
Maruani & Paoletti, supra note 75, at 12 (author's translation); see also Marie-Jo Zimmermann et al., Interview, Marie-Jo Zimmermann: un engagement dans l'espace de la cause des femmes, 17 HIsTOIiRE@PoLITQuE 87 (2012) ("I still do not define myself as a feminist but others consider me as one, so I guess I must be one of them.") (author's translation).
77.
See S.G. Sebaoui, Marie-Jo Zimmermann: "J'irai encore plus loin ... jusqu'aux intercommunalitis!," LE REPUBLICAIN LORRAIN (Jan. 17, 2017, 9:00 PM), http://www. republicain-lorrain.fr/edition-de-metz-ville/2017/01/17/marie-jo-zimmermann-j-irai-encoreplus-loin-jusqu-aux-intercommunalites.
78.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
Zimmermann and Cop6 repeated the Norwegian business case argument-that a critical mass of women would deepen the talent pool with "women's traits," such as risk aversion and methodical analysis, that would improve profitability.7 9 Without a critical mass, minority members become token. These paternalist tendencies toward the private sector echoed Cop6's regulating the "private" choice of wearing a burqa. Businesses resisted quotas and hoped voluntary measures would forestall legislation, but Zimmerman rejected this effort, insisting that a quota would "get things to move"; the legislature soon passed the law.80
The Law 2011-103, entitled "On the balanced representation of women and men on boards of directors and supervisory boards and professional equality," 8 1 required mixiti for some 2000 publicly traded companies in France. 82 Inspired by Norway's law, the National Assembly framed the quota as a floor for both sexes, 83 not as a sexspecific quota. 84 The legislation imposed a six-year schedule for
79.
Forty percent surpasses the 30% critical mass level, the minimum inclusion required for a minority to affect a deliberative body. Below one-third representation, the 
82.
Id.; France Sets Quota for Women on Big Companies'Boards, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2011, 2:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-equality/france-sets-quota-forwomen-on-big-companies-boards-idUSTRE70C5ZA20110113.
83.
STORVIK 87 The CBQ's passage immediately effected change. 88 Firms of all sizes sharply increased their levels of women's representation.89 As a matter of general governance, French law limits individuals to four board memberships. 90 This rule, combined with the scale of France's economy-the fifth largest in the world-meant that the CBQ created an enormous demand for women board members; firms wanted to secure the most "competent" women for their boards. As a result, seven of the top ten global firms are French, with high levels of women's representation on their boards. 9 1 The efficacy of the CBQ may derive from conservatives' incorporation of business goals and the widely held goal of profit rather than from a normative argument of equality.
Thanks to Pariti, feminism reached through the state into corporate regulation to grasp a piece of the boardroom. The CBQ's passage marked a historical moment when feminist ideas of women's inclusion became such a fundamental part of public norms that feminists were not needed to make the argument: it was feminist influence rather than feminist activism. As feminist ideas disappeared in plain sight with the veil and burqa debates, here they became intrinsic to the very definition of French democracy. After the CBQ, related regulations advanced sex equality throughout French elites in government, education, and other areas of society.
However, as this Essay suggests, the CBQ was not just about the relationship between feminism and capital but also about how the new law advanced the norms of the veil and burqa bans. Indeed, reflecting on the CBQ, Cop6 and Zimmermann each linked the CBQ with France's colonial past. In a 2011 colloquium in a jewel-like palace on the Champs-Elys6es, Cop6 remarked that the test of a society's civilization is in how it treats its women. 92 France was highly civilized, Cop6 seemed to insist-it promotes women to corporate elites and saves them from "an injury to the dignity of woman," and ensures their inclusion in the vivre ensemble.93 Rhetoric praising the CBQ's civilizing effects resurfaced four years later, at a 2015 colloquium at the National Assembly in which Zimmermann praised Moroccan interest in a corporate board quota, noting that it reflected a desire to resist integrisme or religious fundamentalism. 94 For her, Moroccan interest in a CBQ confirmed that women's equality could civilize people in France or in its former colony. 
B. Feminism Transformed The Corporate Board Quota's Effects
Espousing valeurs rdpublicaines, nonfeminist actors deployed feminist arguments pioneered in the Pariti effort to advance exclusions. 95 Then with the CBQ, feminism again appears inclusive-to force mixit6 into the corporate hierarchy. But let us pause to assess what feminism wrought once it entered the corporate sector. If Paritd's inclusion meant governance including women, the CBQ reflected a different kind of feminism: one that advanced some at the expense of others, which fortified exclusions. This subpart will describe those who profited and those who paid.
Who Profits?
One goal of Norway's CBQ was to balance opportunities for people without regard to sex by improving women's opportunities.96 CBQs reflect the way in which the private depends on the publicextending public norms into the private sphere fosters sex equality.97 The sheer number of firms with board positions now reserved for women will elevate thousands of women to corporate boards.
This expansion created a rapid and immense distributive shift, a gold rush for women with a stream of new organizations.98 While this was a far broader network than the tight group that previously held board positions, it remained one that benefited people of relative privilege. An "old girls network" grew, as did alumnae networks, social groups, educational programs, and coaching and executive
95.
See, e.g., Le Bars, supra note 52 (former president Nicholas Sarkovsky describing the burqa as "a sign of enslavement"). [Vol. 92:469 search firms, all in the effort to identify, train, and place women on boards. 99 The annual "Women's Forum"-a conference devoted to promoting women's business leadership-now draws thousands of women. 100 But the fact remains that the CBQ necessarily provides an advantage to elites-often white, bourgeois women-not to broader groups of women.101 To retain their class power, business elites choose women who reflect their own existing elite-driven norms. 10 2 In addition, to get these positions, women may "man up": engage in professional performances that demonstrate their masculinized skill sets to a maledriven marketplace. 103 Women in the workplace face a double bind as they need to perform masculinity to appear skilled but must also 102. Quotas may prove useful even if the least progressive women attain power through them-one could argue that they would still advance gender balance more than the patriarchal leftovers that occupy our corporations and government. perform femininity to appeal to (most of) the men who may hire them. Ultimately, thanks to their gender performance-balancing act, these women may "feminize" the firm somewhat less than feminists hope.
Who Pays?
Quotas designed to foster equality result in real costs to men. 1 0 Absent state intervention, men form an elite that, in a monopolistic way, would cyclically replace itself with like-minded men. With quotas, men lose the near-exclusivity of their economic and social power and their attendant network dominance. The CBQ institutes a temporary glass ceiling for men, in place until the boards actually have 40% women. The ceiling means that most, if not all, new members for a period of time will be women; thereby ensuring that the few remaining "male" slots become more competitive. Many qualified men suffer real loss, especially those whose advanced career status renders their experience less transferrable.105
By definition, quotas essentialize sex. That sex difference, the essentialist binary, will determine who gets board positions. Gender equality remedies require that individuals-board members, political candidates, or students-fit into the male/female binary. The binary excludes persons of other sexes and genders, who then fall into a precarious uncertainty.106 Given the performativity demands of elite positions, the hurdles for gender nonconforming individuals to rise to the top are largely insurmountable. Such costs may, however, hold benefits for individuals and society. Two benefits surface with regard to the loss of this monopoly on power: First, men may improve their skills to match demand, as do firms that compete harder after they lose monopoly power. Given what we know about diversity, firms may benefit even if men privately view this change as a personal cost. Second, sex equality in elite work may facilitate gender balance in family contexts. 10 7 For heterosexual couples, women's success may facilitate men's engaging in family work. 08 Quotas may also undermine the sex binary by rebalancing the profile of typical corporate leaders to include women and reducing opportunity differentials based on sex. Including women in corporate leadership will reduce income and, eventually, disparities in care work. Forty percent acts as a floor that might ultimately impose a minimum number of men to serve on the board.1 09 The CBQ's 40% floor instead of Paritd's 50% requirement may shift this binarist emphasis. Because of this possibility, the CBQ may carry slightly fewer essentialist effects than Parite.
After the success of Pariti and the CBQ, conservatives managed to reimagine the status of women as a national priority that--contrary to feminists' original goals-provided cover to institute paternalist protections against so-called backward practices such as traditional 108. Sex neutral parental leave laws, as I have argued, affect men and women differently, particularly where women hold family responsibilities and men face stigma for taking leave. Here we can note that some Scandinavian leave laws incentivize both parents within a family structure to take parental leave. The 2014 ban in Wissous, a city near Paris, provides an example: for their seasonal outdoor swimming pool and beach, the rules forbade wearing "ostentatious religious signs susceptible to create public order disruption."16 The penalties for ignoring the ban were relatively minor.17 Despite the veil ban's use of non-Muslim-specific language, a court struck down the rule.118 Nevertheless, more than thirty towns banned burkinis on their beaches, even though one mayor had never seen one. 1 19 Politicians repurposed the successful feminist arguments from the burqa debate for the burkini-focusing on ensuring women's freedom from religiously forced modesty. 120 As with CBQs and The Conseil d'tat overturned the bans after the controversy reached a head over the course of the summer of 2016.133 In late August, the Conseil stated that the localities should first maintain order then balance any bans with the value of access to the beach. 134 Focusing on the Villeneuve-Loubet rule, from a town near Nice where the Bastille Day terror attack occurred, the judge found no basis for a threat to public order.135 The heightened emotion and anxiety resulting from the Nice terrorist attack did not justify the ban. The judge's decision focused on the personal liberty involved in one's own choice of clothing. 136 As Stephanie Hennette Vauchez argued prior to the decision of the Conseil d'tat, burkini laws restricted liberty and constituted discrimination against MuslimS.1 37 The decision now stands and is unlikely to be overturned unless by national legislative action or constitutional reform.
Immediately after the burkini decision, Gaspard reiterated her pluralist feminism to agree with the Conseil d'Itat's decision. 138 Had ban supporters reacted negatively to the decision, they may have sought national legislation to override it. 139 Banning the burkini would lead to its proliferation, Gaspard argued, and the ban would be 133. CE, Aug. 26, 2016, 402742. The Conseil d'ttat first analyzed the competence of the mayors issuing public orders, noting that mayors have to balance maintaining public order and respecting individual freedoms. Id. The court said that any restriction of beach access must be necessary, proportionate, adapted, and taken for one of the following reasons: proper access to the shore, swimming safety, hygiene, or decency. Id. Mayors cannot base their decision on accounts other than known (or proven) risks to public order. Id. The court said the local ordinance of Villeneuve-Loubet described no risk of public disorder coming from people wearing certain types of bathing attires and emphasized that the emotion and anxiety arising from the Nice terrorist attack were not enough to legally justify the ban. Id. The court held, therefore, that the mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet acted beyond his powers. Id. The court also described the local ordinance as presenting a serious and obvious violation of fundamental freedoms, notably the freedom of movement and the freedom of conscience. Id. Although popular, the reversal of burkini bans presaged another centrist shift-the presidential and legislative elections of 2017. Emmanuel Macron swept both elections with his new party, La R~publique en Marche.141 Their forward-looking image of France was more inclusive than traditional parties. As a result, of the 577 members of the National Assembly, approximately twenty legislators come from a background issu de l'immigration, although the press did not ascribe any religious affiliation to these leaders, following the state's prohibition of reporting religious identity.142 One news source proclaimed, "The National Assembly is finally in the image of the country." the university-as restricting the liberty of such women.1 47 Bans would relegate women to life within their communities when laciti stands against communitarisme. Macron argued that the French rule is latciti not laicisme-a belief in a civic religion. 148 Macron's victory and that of his party repudiated the existing political order. But we cannot presume that he will reverse the paternalist tide carried so far in part by feminist rhetoric. The bans' continued success poses questions for feminisms that take hold, even tenuously, of the state's reins.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Feminists pursued inclusion in the Republic with Paritd and they succeeded in convincing France to enshrine their essentialist norms. Once it became a valeur rdpublicaine, feminism changed. It went from a 1990s outsider perspective to a central tenet of the twenty-first century, demonstrated by fluid feminist arguments by male leaders of both left (Socialist) and right (UMP) parties. Despite Paritd's limited success in actually fixing sex ratios in elected officialdom, the perseverance of male dominance in politics-combined with widespread use of feminist language-makes some of this feminism look more like old-school chivalry. France included women in economic leadership with the CBQ and reduced "enslavement" by restricting Muslim women's clothing, including veils, burqas, and, briefly, burkinis. Quotas legitimize certain identity differences to the exclusion of others. The linkage of feminism and the valeurs rdpublicaines within universalism transformed French law, as it juxtaposed inclusive remedies (Pariti and the CBQ) for sex difference against exclusionary ones (veil, burqa, and burkini bans) related to religion and ethnicity.149 This transformation of feminism within the state poses genuine conflicts for feminist advocacy.
